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Chinese engagement in African security — pragmatism and shifts  
under the surface 
China’s “going out” policy of the late 1990s, was, by Euro-
American standards of investment, marked by a conspicuous 
lack of attention to risk of which Africa was a crucial target. 
Instead, the global activities were originally very much driven by 
the need to directly seek resources needed for domestic growth 
in China. This appears to be slowly changing.  
Not only was there originally an underestimation of costs but 
also a virtual dearth of concern about political risk. The growing 
engagement has frequently been packaged in a narrative of 
Africa as a continent of opportunities, a “last frontier” of global 
economic development. Estimates give limited amounts of return 
to Chinese enterprises with their African ventures; about 80 per 
cent of the investments are said to have not (yet) yielded 
economic benefits to Chinese companies. This has been 
compounded by the fact that many of the countries which China 
was engaging with were those which many established western 
firms had deemed too unstable to either invest, or continue 
investing in. Certainly, countries such as France and Britain, and 
their persistence of colonial ties often dove-tailing with current 
business ties made Chinese entrance into African markets all the 
more challenging. 
The nature of the state: dealing with risks in Africa 
Over the last few years, however, awareness about political risks 
for investment in Africa is on the increase in China. This growing 
awareness is not least due to crisis situations in political conflicts 
in Sudan/South Sudan and in Libya, but also linked to kidnapping 
or killing of Chinese workers in Ethiopia, Nigeria or Sudan. This 
growing awareness of risk aversion at enterprise or personal 
level comes at a time of changing geopolitics and changing 
Chinese state engagement. Thus, attempts to mitigate risks are 
coupled with increasing obligations for China as a “responsible 
world power” to play a greater role in peace and security on the 
continent.  
Security concerns in African states are often outsourced to 
private enterprises, which is an interesting variety to both 
European political philosophy and Chinese historical experiences. 
In Europe, security is traditionally based on the idea of the 
state’s monopoly of power. Similarly in China, state power is 
historically strong, in which its leaders - from Qing emperors to 
the Communist Party – have frequently outlawed any 
organization which might pose a threat to the monopoly on 
violence.  While within the international system, African polities 
are treated as if they are equally capable of governing their 
states in a similar fashion, in reality, this is often not the case. In 
Africa, the constructed nature of post-colonial statehood, often 
multi-ethnic in nature, coupled with weak institutional capacity, 
complicates the transferability of European and Chinese methods 
to Africa. 
Beyond the big-picture question of state functioning in Africa, 
three major debates need to be explored in China: one is on the 
analysis of risks and their possible mitigation through 
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preparation. Secondly, an immediate concern is securing Chinese 
assets and staff in their African endeavours. And thirdly, the 
question of modes of engagements and policy-rationale touch 
upon the foreign policy debates. This is related to the terms of 
engagement with regional and continental security institutions 
on the African continent.  
The shifts in Chinese risk analysis and risk mitigation  
The shifting nature of China’s attitude toward risk in Africa is  
highlighted in its Sudanese engagements. China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) ventured into Sudan in 1995, in 
conjunction with Indian and Malaysian companies. The oil 
reserves, located on the political fault line of what was to later 
become the border with South Sudan, required stringent 
protection from SPLA (Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army) attacks. 
Security was put in the hands of the Khartoum government, who 
effectively armed local militias to clear oil related areas, leading 
to forced removals, kidnapping, rape and murder. In accordance 
with China’s “non-interference” policy, the Chinese partners were 
of the view that security issues were in the hands of the 
government, thus absolving them of responsibility of abuses 
carried out. Yet, precisely this attitude led to an association with 
the al Bashir regime, making Chinese workers and facilities 
targets of a number of attacks. 
There has been a notable shift in Chinese attitudes recent years. 
Courting South Sudan has forced China to confront the fact that 
the earlier use of force directly affected the communities in the 
South with which they now strive to do business. CNPC’s has 
introduced corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
schemes; include the drilling of wells, the 
construction of schools and hospitals.  
While such aid packages were given during 
China’s engagement with the Bashir regime, 
much of this investment was delivered to regions 
in the north which benefited the al Bashir 
constituency, while today such engagements are 
more intimately bound up with the communities 
where the oil is being extracted.   
Chinese companies in South Sudan still have a 
tendency of “outsourcing” local community 
engagement to local government instead of face 
to face liaising with the communities themselves. 
Nevertheless, in recent years there has been, 
comparatively speaking, a distinct shift toward 
engaging more with local communities and a 
better understanding of how this directly 
mitigates not only financial and personal risk, but 
reputation risk too. In 2011, the Libyan war and 
the subsequent evacuation of over 36 000 
Chinese citizens from the country, served as  a vital next step in 
China’s awareness of risk in Africa (see Box 1) .  
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Box 1: Protecting Chinese citizens: Libya 2011 as a watershed 
moment 
High-risk episodes on the African continent have contributed toward a 
more risk-conscious China. A turning-point in this regard was the  
evacuation of 35 860 Chinese employees from Libya during the 2011 
Civil War. President at the time, Hu Jintao, issued the unusual statement 
that he had ordered government workers “to spare no efforts to ensure 
the safety of life and properties of Chinese citizens in Libya.”  Such 
measures send a strong signal by Beijing that it will not tolerate Chinese 
citizens being harmed abroad. Such a reaction is, in part, geared toward 
domestic politics insofar as China’s “going abroad” strategy has given 
rise to concerns amongst the population that the state has been, at 
times, either indifferent or impotent in the wake of attacks on nationals 
abroad.  
The event also illustrates the unique way in which Chinese companies 
and various ministries of state are able to co-ordinate with each other in 
times of crises.  The evacuation was a vast, interconnected effort involv-
ing the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN); the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Commerce and Public Security; the Civil Aviation Administration 
and various consular officials. PLAN dispatched one of its most modern 
warships to waters near Libya in order to facilitate the evacuation. China 
drew on its consulates in Malta and Greece, as well as using airbases in 
the Sudan in order to evacuate citizens. Chinese companies such as 
CNPC, China Rail Construction and COSCO helped evacuate citizens. 
These companies, all of which are SOEs, helped facilitate swift communi-
cation and action between employees and various state organs. This is in 
large part due to the unique nature of Chinese SOE’s which largely func-
tion like private companies but still continue to have strong links with the 
state. 
Diagram 1: Map of Sudan’s oil region 
Source: PBS NewsHour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/02/sudan-oil.html 
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Securing assets abroad: enter private security business? 
For asset security, private companies are an established business 
in many African countries. Chinese companies are also 
increasingly interested in the business activities of the security 
sector in Africa, for instance, providing personal security guards 
or system solutions to Chinese enterprises.  
In China, security companies are subsidiaries of the local Chinese 
police force. The prospect of outsourcing security to private 
companies of Chinese origin comes with additional challenges for 
the Chinese state. While the Chinese government legally permits 
such ventures, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is weary to promote 
such activity primarily because it may impact upon China’s 
struggle against negative publicity on the continent (as in the 
case scenario of Chinese guards firing on Africans). Despite such 
reticence, there have equally been calls by government officials 
for an increase in such services (see box 2). In any case, local 
laws would need to be carefully studied and adhered to by the 
security enterprises in order to avoid diplomatic quarrel in core 
questions of state sovereignty 
Regional security and the need for enhanced action 
Chinese activities in support of African peace initiatives to date 
seem to be rather ad hoc. In support for the African Peace and 
Security Architecture, hard infrastructure is supported, such as 
the AU headquarters building in Addis Ababa. Yet, there is still 
little engagement on “soft infrastructure”, not least so in 
investing in human resources in Africa. Positively speaking, the 
policy responses are highly pr gmatic. More critically spoken, 
activities are not presented in a comprehensive framework. 
Chinese economic investment in Africa has been accompanied by 
an increasing role as arbitrator in regional African affairs, as 
witnessed in the Sudan, Liberia, and more recently, Mali. These 
changes happened under an officially unchanged doctrine of “non
-interference”, in other words, a rather orthodox Westphalian 
understanding of state sovereignty and what constitutes “internal 
affairs” of a state. One core condition for Chinese engagement is 
a UN mandate for actions – which China herself can somewhat 
control, as it is a veto power in the UN Security Council.  
Yet, also with regard to military engagement, shifts are 
noticeable. China provides the biggest number of blue-helmets 
among the permanent member of the UN Security Council and 
has a number of training centres for UN missions of its soldiers in 
China herself. In 2013, China deployed its first combat troops, 
under the auspices of a UN peacekeeping mission, in Mali. 
 
Diagram 2: Evacuation of Chinese nationals out of Libya to secondary countries by air, land and sea 
Source: Own illustration 
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Conclusions 
The engagement in African security has become a necessity for the 
Chinese state if it does not want to leave the field to haphazard 
activities of enterprises. Any crisis in the area of personal security 
or securing investment will ultimately raise questions about state 
sovereignty and abilities to project power if needed. 
China is starting to invest in a more far-sighted form of securitizing 
assets and personnel insofar as it seeks to create a more sustained 
stability within the region, including via means of corporate 
engagement. Such shifts are part of a far broader commitment at 
the level of the Chinese state. However, there is  little debate thus 
far on China’s need to become a “responsible world power” and all 
that this notion might imply.  
The engagement with and strengthening of regional and national 
institutions is a crucial pre-condition for peace and security in the 
African context. States in Africa often are weaker than Chinese 
observers seem to assume. Long-term security in Africa will only be 
possible with legitimate and responsive administrative structures. 
Engaging with these institutions will be a challenge for China, but 
neutrality is rarely credible from investors in conflict situations. 
African actors themselves will demand a more pro-active – and 
peaceful – engagement with African structures.  
Recommendations 
A fully hands-off policy is no longer possible, as, at the very least, 
occurring crises will have to be managed. The term “non-
interference” is thus misleading as a foreign policy doctrine.  
Crisis situations need to be somewhat prepared for, so that 
responses follow a longer-term political rationale and happen within 
a clear chain of command between different parts of the 
administration. Political guidelines for these crises abroad would 
need to include and clarify the role of enterprises and the function 
(and limitations) of private security actors.  
A policy paper would be helpful on how China interprets the 
political space around African security and how it wishes to 
contribute to fostering peace and security on the continent. A 
comprehensive overview is an effort in itself, as it provides for an 
occasion for co-ordination amongst different administrative units. 
Ideally, however, such a paper provides policy rationales from 
which ways forward can be elaborated with regard to future 
challenges. This should also be considered as instrumental in 
gradually shifting away from the politically unsustainable notion of 
non-interference.  
 
This policy briefing draws on deliberations at the conference 
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Box 2: Chinese Private Security Companies  
While at present the role of Chinese private security companies (PSC) 
within Africa is minimal, although that looks set to change. A former head 
of National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con-
ference, recently called for the establishment of a Chinese version of 
Backwater – the American security company outsourced by the US gov-
ernment in its adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Growing Chinese in-
vestment in risk-prone African countries, coupled with high profile inci-
dents of the kidnapping and murder of Chinese company staff in the 
Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Chad and Ethiopia, add credence to the need for 
Chinese protection services. At present, the vast majority of Chinese 
companies either use local and international private security firms or, in 
the case of the oil industry, the use of military protection offered by the 
host country. 
China has witnessed a rapid rise of security firms within its own borders. 
At present there are over 4000 security companies operating in China, 
employing 4.3 million people and worth over 40 Billion Yuan (although it 
reckoned that both these figures could be doubled). In 2009 the Chinese 
government announced a new security regulation which allowed the 
opening of the market to both domestic and foreign investors. Since 
2010, an estimated 1000 security licenses have been issued to private 
security companies not belonging to the Public Security Bureau. The 
market is thus ripe for outward expansion.  
One niche within which Chinese PSC may situate themselves is the com-
petitive advantage offered by issues of mutual communication and trust 
between Chinese PSC and Chinese corporations. Another advantage is 
that the cost of Chinese guards is, at least in comparison to the price for 
a guard from an international firm, relatively cheap.  It is realistic to as-
sume that Chinese PSCs will most likely partner with ether local or inter-
national security firms already operating in Africa and offer their services 
exclusively to Chinese clientele. A number of Chinese PSCs have already 
expressed interest in these kinds of ventures. 
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